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Abstract
Deep reinforcement learning has shown promising results in learning control
policies for complex sequential decision-making tasks. However, these neural
network-based policies are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. This
vulnerability poses a potentially serious threat to safety-critical systems such as
autonomous vehicles. In this paper, we propose a defense mechanism to defend
reinforcement learning agents from adversarial attacks by leveraging an action-
conditioned frame prediction module. Our core idea is that the adversarial examples
targeting at a neural network-based policy are not effective for the frame prediction
model. By comparing the action distribution produced by a policy from processing
the current observed frame to the action distribution produced by the same policy
from processing the predicted frame from the action-conditioned frame prediction
module, we can detect the presence of adversarial examples. Beyond detecting
the presences of adversarial examples, our method allows the agent to continue
performing the task using the predicted frame when the agent is under attack.
We evaluate the performance of our algorithm using five games in Atari 2600.
Our results demonstrate that the proposed defense mechanism achieves favorable
performance against baseline algorithms in detecting adversarial examples and in
earning rewards when the agents are under attack.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning algorithms that utilize Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) as function approxi-
mators have emerged as powerful tools for learning policies for solving a wide variety of sequential
decision-making tasks, including playing games [28, 37] and executing complex locomotions [35].
These methods have also been extended to robotic research and shown promising results in several
applications such as robotic manipulation, navigation, and autonomous driving [3, 19, 44].
As inheriting the learning capability from DNNs, DNN-based policies also inherit the vulnerability to
adversarial examples as shown in [1, 14, 22]. Adversarial examples are inputs corrupted by small,
imperceivable perturbations that are carefully crafted for producing dramatic changes in outputs of
a machine learning system. Adversarial examples have been extensively studied in the context of
image classification [12, 39], object detection and semantic segmentation [7, 41], and their existences
in the physical world were recently revealed by Kurakin et al. [18]. For DNN-based policies, the
vulnerability to adversarial attack [1, 14, 22] can potentially pose a significant danger to safety-critical
applications including self-driving cars and human-robot collaboration platforms. Hence, developing
an effective defensive mechanism against adversarial examples is an important problem.
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
00
81
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
 O
ct 
20
17
adversarial example?
[…, up]
𝑥"#$#%:"#%
detector
𝑥"
detector𝑎"#$#%:"#%𝑥"
adversarial example?
(a) Single input (b) Multiple inputs (ours)
Figure 1: Inputs of an adversarial examples detector. Let xt be current input frame, xt−m−1:t−1 be
previous m input frames, and at−m−1:t−1 be previous m executed actions. (a) Existing defense
approaches for detecting adversarial examples are mainly developed in the context of image
classification. As a result, these defense approaches take only one single frame as input per defense
act. (b) In contrast, the proposed defense leverages the temporal coherence of multiple inputs and the
executed actions over time to detect adversarial attacks.
In this paper, we propose a defense mechanism specially designed to detect adversarial attacks
on DNN-based policies and provide action suggestions for agents when under attacks. As shown
in Figure 1, unlike existing defensive methods developed for image classification that only use
information in one image per defense act, the proposed method leverages temporal coherence of
multiple frames in sequential decision-making tasks. Specifically, we train a visual foresight module—
an action-conditioned frame prediction model that predicts the current frame based on the past
observed frames and actions. In general, future frame prediction is a difficult problem. However,
in domains where the system dynamics are known or can be accurately modeled (e.g., robotic
manipulation [10] or video games [30]), we can train an accurately visual foresight module. With the
visual foresight module, we can detect adversarial examples by comparing 1) the action distribution
generated by the policy using the current observed frame and 2) the action distribution generated
by the same policy but using the predicted frame. When adversarial perturbations are present in
the current frame, the two action distributions will be very different, and their similarity provides
a measure of the presence of adversarial attacks. Once adversarial attacks are detected, an agent
could thus act based on the predicted frame instead of the observed frame. Of course, adversarial
examples could also be present in the previous frames, which are used by the visual foresight module.
However, since the adversarial examples are crafted to fool the policy, not the visual foresight module,
its impact to the visual foresight module is small. Consequently, the visual foresight module can still
predict plausible current frame conditioning on previous (and potentially attacked) frames and the
executed actions.
The proposed defense has the following three main merits. First, our approach produces action
suggestions using the visual foresight model for the agent under attack to retain its performance.
In contrast to existing defensive mechanisms for image classification where the goal is to reject
adversarial examples, our approach provides ways for the agent to maneuver under adversarial
attacks. For example, with the proposed defensive method, a robot arm can safely manipulate an
adversarially perturbed object instead of accidentally damaging it. Second, our approach does not
require adversarial examples to construct the defense. This suggests that our method is not specific
to a particular adversarial attack as several existing methods [12, 26] are. Third, our method is
model-agnostic and thus can potentially be used to protect a wide range of different DNN-based
policies.
We validate the effectiveness of the proposed defensive mechanism in Atari game environments. We
show that our defense can reliably detect adversarial examples under consecutive attacks. Using the
proposed action suggestions, our results show that the agent can retain the performance even when a
large portion of time steps was attacked. Our approach demonstrates favorable results over several
strong baseline detectors developed for detecting adversarial examples for image classification. We
also characterize the performance over the accuracy of the frame prediction model.
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Figure 2: Threat model. (a) A well-trained agent can process the normal inputs and choose
appropriate actions to achieve high cumulated rewards. (b) In our threat model, the adversary is not
aware of the defense, but is aware of the parameters θpi of the policy. The adversary can thus apply
malicious crafted perturbation δt to degrade the run-time performance of a trained agent piθpi . In this
example, the adversary fools the agent to produce an incorrect action distribution piθpi (xadvt ).
Our contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop defensive methods against adver-
sarial examples for DNN-based policies by leveraging temporal coherency.
• The proposed defense method can not only detect adversarial examples but also provide
action suggestions to retain agents’ performance. On five games of Atari 2600, our defense
mechanism significantly increases agents’ robustness to reasonable limited-time attack.
• Our method is agnostic to both the model of the policy and the adversary. Therefore, our
approach can be applied to protect a wide variety of policies without collecting adversarial
examples ahead of time.
• We discuss several practical aspects of adversarial attacks on DNN-based policies and
limitations of our approach.
2 Related Work
Adversarial examples. Szegedy et al. [39] first showed an intriguing property that deep neural
networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples—maliciously designed inputs to cause a model to
make a mistake in the context of image classification tasks. Several recent efforts have been devoted to
developing more sophisticated attacks [5, 12, 18, 29, 33] and demonstrating the feasibility of attacking
real-world machine learning systems using adversarial examples [23, 32]. Beyond classification
tasks, it has also been shown that other applications of deep learning such as deep neural network
policies and deep generative models are also vulnerable to adversarial examples [14, 16, 17, 22]. As
adversarial examples pose potential security threats to machine learning based applications, designing
defensive mechanisms that can protect against such adversaries is of great importance. Our goal in
this paper is to develop a defense to protect deep neural network policies.
Defenses against adversarial examples. Existing defense mechanisms mostly focus on image
classification tasks. These approaches can be grouped into two main categories. The first category
proposes enhanced training procedures to make a trained model robust to adversarial examples.
Methods in this category include adversarial training [12, 18] and defensive distillation [31, 34].
Recently, it has been shown that this category of methods is not effective against optimization-
based adversarial attacks [5]. The second category focuses on detecting and rejecting adversarial
perturbations [2, 8, 11, 13, 20, 21, 26, 42]. While these methods are promising in detecting adversarial
examples, they do not provide a mechanism to carry out the recognition task under adversarial attacks.
Our method differs from existing work in two main aspects. First, existing defense approaches focus
on image classification tasks, and thus the mechanism is based on a single image. In contrast, we focus
on the problem of detecting adversarial examples in sequential decision-making tasks by exploiting
the temporal coherence of multiple input observations. Second, in addition to detecting adversarial
examples, our method also provides action suggestions for the agents under attack and help the
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agents retain its performance. Such a property is particularly important in sequential decision-making
applications.
Video prediction. Predicting future frames given the current observed frames [9, 10, 24, 30, 38,
40, 43] itself is an important problem. Among the future frame prediction works, the works on
action-conditioned next frame prediction methods [9, 10, 30] are particularly suitable for predicting
the future frame that could be observed by an agent. Our work applies an action-conditioned frame
prediction model for detecting adversarial examples in sequential decision tasks.
3 Preliminaries
Reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning concerns learning a policy for an agent to take
actions to interact with an environment in order to maximize the cumulative reward. Here, the
environment is modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). An MDP M is a 5-tuple (S,A,P,R,γ),
where S is a set of states, A is a set of actions, P(st+1 | st ,at) is the transition probability from state at
the t-th step st ∈ S to st+1 ∈ S after performing the action at ∈ A, R(rt+1 | st ,at) is the probability of
receiving reward rt+1 after performing action at at state st , and γ ∈ [0,1] is a future reward discounted
rate. The goal of the agent is to learn a policy pi : S→ A, which maps a state to an action, to maximize
the expected cumulative reward collected in an episode of T steps s0,a0,r1,s1,a1,r2, ...,sT . When a
complete state st in an environment is not visible, the agent take as input the observation xt of the
environment.
Threat model. Figure 2 illustrates our threat model. At each time step t, an adversary can use
adversarial examples generation algorithms to craft malicious perturbation δt and apply it to the
observation xt to create perturbed observation xadvt . Taking x
adv
t as input, the agent produces an
incorrect action distribution piθpi (xadvt ) which may degrade its performance. Specifically, we consider
the white-box attack where the adversary has access to the parameters of the policy network to craft
perturbed observation. We further assume that the adversary is static (i.e., the adversary is unaware
of the defense mechanism being used).
4 Adversarial Example Detection
Our goal is to detect the presence of adversarial attack at each time step in a sequential decision
task. We denote the observation perceived by the agent at time step t as xt . In our threat model
(Figure 2), the observation xtcan either be a normal (clean) observation xnormalt or a maliciously
perturbed observation xadvt . Compared to existing defense methods developed for image classification
tasks that take a single image as input, our method leverages the past m observations xt−m:t−1 and
actions at−m:t−1, as illustrated Figure 1. In addition to detecting adversarial attacks, we show that our
method can help the agent maneuver under adversarial attacks. Below we describe our approach in
detail.
4.1 Detecting Adversarial Attacks
Figure 3 illustrates the pipeline of the proposed method. At time step t, the action-conditioned
frame prediction model Gθg takes m previous observations xt−m:t−1 and corresponding m actions
at−m:t−1 as input to predict the current observation xˆt . Given a normal observation xnormalt at the
current time step t, the action distribution that the agent uses to sample an action from is piθpi (xnormalt ),
which should be similar to the action distribution of piθpi (xˆt) from the predicted frame. On the other
hand, if the current input is adversarially perturbed, that is the agent observed xadvt instead of x
normal
t ,
then the resulting action distribution piθpi (xadvt ) should differ a lot from piθpi (xˆt) because the goal
of the adversary is to perturb the input observation xt to cause the agent to take a different action.
Therefore, we can use the similarity between the two action distributions to detect the presence of
adversarial attacks. Specifically, we compute D(piθpi (xˆt),piθpi (xt)), where D(·, ·) is a distance metric
measuring the similarity. In this work, we use the `1 distance as the distance metric but note that
other alternatives such as chi-squared distance or histogram intersection distance can be used as well.
We label xt as an adversarial example when D(piθpi (xˆt),piθpi (xt)) exceeds a predefined threshold H.
4.2 Providing Action Suggestions
In addition to detecting adversarial attacks, our approach can provide action suggestions using the
predicted frame from the visual foresight module. Specifically, when an attack is detected at time
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Figure 3: Algorithm overview. The illustration here describes the scenarios where an adversary
applies a consecutive attacks on the agent piθpi . At the time step t−1 and t, the agent perceives the
maliciously perturbed inputs xadvt−1 and x
adv
t and may produces action distributions that lead to poor
performance. With the incorporation of the visual foresight module that predicts the current frame xˆt
given the previous observations and executed actions, we can produce the action distribution piθpi (xˆt)
based on the predicted observations. By computing the similarity between the two action
distributions piθpi (xt) and piθpi (xˆt), we can determine the presence of the adversarial example if the
distance D(piθpi (xˆt),piθpi (xt)) exceeds a pre-defined threshold H.
step t, we replace the action distribution piθpi (xadvt ) (produced by processing the original, potentially
attacked observations) to the action distribution piθpi (xˆt).
4.3 Design of Frame Prediction Module
Our visual foresight module is a frame prediction model that predicts the next observation xtgiven
the m previous observations xt−m:t−1 and corresponding m actions at−m:t−1. We adopt the network
architecture design in Oh et al. [30], which consists of three parts: 1) an encoder, 2) a multiplicative
action-conditional transformation, and 3) a decoder.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we validate the effectiveness of the proposed defense mechanism against adversarial
examples. After describing the implementation details in Section 5.1, we will characterize the
performance of attack detection in terms of precision and recall curves Section 5.2 and the effect of
action suggestion using cumulative rewards under various levels of attack in Section 5.3. We will then
discuss the effects on the performance over the accuracy of the frame prediction model in Section 5.4.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. Following previous works [14, 22] which demonstrate the vulnerability of DNN-based
policy, we use five Atari 2600 games, PONG, SEAQUEST, FREEWAY CHOPPERCOMMAND and
MSPACMAN in our experiments to cover a wide variety of environments. We choose the game
environment to validate the effectiveness of the proposed defense mechanism because we can easily
apply adversarial attacks on the inputs using existing adversarial example generation algorithms.
Extension to a physical setting (e.g., evaluating on robot manipulation or planning tasks) is non-trivial
as it remains difficult to apply adversarial attacks at each time step in the physical world. We leave
the extension to future work.
Training DNN-based policy. We train our agent for each game using the DQN algorithm [28].
We follow the input pre-processing steps and the neural network architecture as described in [28].
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Specifically, the input to the policy is a concatenation of the last 4 frames, converted to grayscale
and resized to 84×84. For each game, we sample three random initializations of neural network
parameters to train different policies. All of our experiments are performed using well-trained agents
(i.e., the policies achieve at least 80% of the maximum reward for the last ten training iterations).
While we use DQN [28] in our experiments, we note that our defense mechanism is agnostic to
the policy used (i.e., the same approach can be applied to alternative DNN-based policies such as
A3C [27] and TRPO [36]).
Training action-conditioned frame prediction model. After training our agents, we use them
to generate game-play video datasets using ε-greedy policies which force the agents to choose a
random action with 30% probability. We obtain 1,000,000 training frames for each game. Following
Mnih et al. [28], we choose actions once every 4 frames and thereby reduce the frame-rate of
the video from 60fps to 15fps. The number of available actions ranges from 3 to 18. We directly
collect observations of agents and pre-process the images by subtracting the mean pixel values and
dividing each pixel value by 255. We adopt the CNN architecture and training procedure of [30] to
implement our action-conditioned frame prediction model. Specifically, we adopt the curriculum
learning scheme with three phases of increasing prediction step objectives of 1, 3 and 5 steps, and
learning rates of 10−4, 10−5 and 10−5. We optimize the model using Adam optimizer [15] with batch
sizes of 32, 8, and 8. We conduct all of our experiments using OpenAI Gym [4]. We will make the
source code publicly available.
5.2 Detecting Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial example generation algorithms. We evaluate our proposed method against three
different adversarial example generation algorithms: FGSM [12], BIM [18], and Carlini et al. [5]
with `∞-norm constraints ε = 0.003.
Defense approaches. We compare our method with three adversarial example detectors for image
classification:
• Feature Squeezing [42]: We use the default parameters (e.g., 2×2 median filters) as sug-
gested by the authors.
• Autoencoder [25]: We use the same architecture of our frame prediction model but remove
the multiplicative action-conditional transformation. We use the same amount of training
data for action-conditioned frame prediction model to train the Autoencoder.
• Dropout-based detection [8]: We train a DQN agent using dropout with probability 0.2
before the fully connected layers. We keep the dropout during testing and process each
frame 30 times to estimate the uncertainty of the policy prediction. We can then use this
uncertainty measure to detect adversarial examples. Our results show that the algorithm is
not sensitive to the number of samples for estimating the uncertainty when it is greater than
20. We thus use 30 in our experiments.
Note that we do not use other detector-based defense mechanisms that require collecting adversarial
examples for training their detectors.
Quantitative evaluation. We present the quantitative evaluation of adversarial attacks detection.
We characterize the level of the adversarial attack using “attack ratio”, indicating the probability that
an adversary launches an attack at each time step.
For each game, we run the agent five times where we set the attack ratio as 0.5 (i.e., half of the time
steps are attacked). We report the mean and the variance of the precision and recall curves in Figure 4.
Note that we only count the “successful” adversarial examples that do change the action of the agent
as positives. In all five games under different types of attacks, our results show that the proposed
adversarial detection algorithm compare favorably against other baseline approaches.
In Figure 5, we visualize the action distribution distance D(piθpi (xˆt),piθpi (xt)) over the time steps
in one trial for three games. Here, we apply consecutive attacks periodically for 200 frames. The
visualization shows that we can leverage the distance to identify the adversarial attack even when the
agent is consecutively attacked up to 200 frames.
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Figure 4: Quantitative evaluation on detecting adversarial attacks. Precision-recall curves in
five Atari games. First row: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [12], Second row: Basic Iterative
Method (BIM) [18], and Carlini et al. [5] Note that in computing the precision and recall we
consider only successful adversarial attacks (i.e., attacks that do change the action decision).
Including unsuccessful attack attempts may produce unreasonably high performance and thus does
not reveal the actual accuracy of the detector. Our approach performs favorably against over several
baseline detectors that uses single input. Defense methods: Ours, Feature Squeezer [42],
AutoEncoder [25], and Dropout [8].
attack
PONG
attack
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Figure 5: The action distribution distance with and without adversarial attacks. For each of the
three games, we visualize the action distribution distance D(piθpi (xˆt),piθpi (xt)) across all the time
steps. In this experiment, we apply adversarial attacks periodically for 200 frames as indicated by the
red double arrows. The results show that distance correlate well with time windows under attack,
suggesting that we can leverage it as a discriminative signal for detecting adversarial attacks.
PONG SEAQUEST FREEWAY CHOPPERCOMMAND MSPACMAN
Figure 6: Cumulated rewards under different attack ratio. The x-axis indicates the “attack ratio"
— the percentage of the time steps where we apply adversarial attacks. For example, when the attack
ratio equals one, it indicates that the adversary applies attacks for every time step. By exploiting the
visual foresight module, we can retain the agent’s performance even when a large portion of the time
steps are attacked by an adversary. Other alternatives such as taking random actions when the agent
is under attack are not able to retain competitive performance. Defense methods: Ours
Ours-random Feature Squeezer [42] Feature Squeezer-random
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Figure 7: Detector performance vs. the accuracy of the visual foresight module. Using a more
accurate frame prediction model yields improved performance in detecting adversarial examples.
5.3 Action Suggestion
In Figure 6, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed action suggestion method. We vary the
attack ratio in an episode in the range of [0,1] and show the averaged rewards in a total five trials for
each game. The baseline detector by [42] could also provide action suggestions using the filtered
current frame as input to the policy. We also evaluate “random actions" as another alternative baseline
for action suggestions. When the agent detects an attack at a time step, it selects a random action to
perform. We also show the rewards obtained by the same agent when there are no adversarial attacks
(shown as the solid black lines). Our experiment results demonstrate that the agent is capable of
retaining good performance through the action suggestions even when a large portion of the time
steps were attacked.
5.4 The Effect of Frame Prediction Model
We investigate the effect of the action-conditioned frame prediction model. During the training
process, we take model snapshots at 40K, 80K, 120K, 160K, 320K, and 640K iterations to obtain
frame prediction models with varying degrees of prediction accuracies. We take the game PONG as
an example. We run the policy equipped with different frame prediction models. In Figure 7, we
show the scatter plot showing the relationship between 1) x-axis: the quality of the frame prediction
model (measured in terms of mean squared error) and 2) y-axis: the effectiveness of the detector
(measured in term of mean Average Precision (mAP)). The results show that the accuracy of the
frame prediction model plays a critical role for detecting adversarial examples.
6 Discussions
In this section, we discuss the main limitations of the proposed defense mechanism and describe
potential future directions for addressing these issues.
Defense against an adaptive adversary. In this paper, we only consider the case of static
adversarial attack. Defending against adaptive adversary (who knows about the defense being used)
remains an open problem in the field [6]. We believe that leveraging the temporal coherence and
redundancy may help construct an effective defense against strong, adaptive adversaries. Here
we explain such a potential extension. Our detector leverage previous observations for detecting
adversarial examples. As the agent store these previous observations in its memory, the adversary
cannot change the previous observations perceived by the agent at the current time step t. Such a
design poses an additional challenge for an adaptive adversary to attack our defense. As our frame
prediction model takes m previous observation as inputs, an adaptive adversary can potentially exploit
two strategies. First, the adaptive adversary can start applying the attack at time step t−m in order to
fool the frame prediction model (in addition to fooling the agent). In such cases, however, our defense
will force the adversary to apply the attack in more time steps than needed and therefore render the
adversary easier to be spotted. Second, an adaptive adversary may augment its adversarial example
generation process with a frame prediction module and craft adversarial examples that cause our
8
frame prediction model to predict an adversarial example for the agent. To the best of our knowledge,
no existing frame prediction models can predict adversarial examples for another network (e.g., the
DQN [28] in this paper).
Practical considerations for applying adversarial attack in the physical world. In the real
world, robotics often operate in real time. Therefore, attacking a robotic system using adversarial
examples generated by iterative methods may become impractical as iterative methods are generally
computational expensive. Existing works for crafting adversarial examples for image classification
tasks often do not take the computational cost into consideration when designing an attack algorithm.
In the context of sequential decision-making task in the physical world, we believe that the efforts for
increasing the time required by an adversary to craft an effective adversarial example are promising
directions for securing these systems.
Frame prediction in the physical world. Our defense performance relies on the accuracy of
the action-conditioned frame prediction model as shown in Figure 7. Therefore, our method is
applicable for controlled settings in the physical world (e.g., in-house robotics [10]) and simulated
environment (e.g., games [30]) where we can train an accurate action-conditioned frame prediction
model. Extending it to the unconstrained setting in the physical world is not trivial because of the
vast appearance variations and uncertainty of the immediate future. One promising extension is to
simultaneously train the DNN-based policy and the frame prediction model so that the agent can
accommodate the artifacts produced by the frame prediction model.
Integration with other techniques. We note that the proposed defense leverages temporal coher-
ence for detecting adversarial examples. Such temporal information is orthogonal with existing
methods that exploit information extracted from a single input. Consequently, our approach can po-
tentially be integrated with adversarial training [12], defensive distillation [34] and other adversarial
examples detection algorithms to construct a stronger defense.
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